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agricultural policy: greening or greenwashing?
Gerry Alons
Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
The increasing multidimensionality of agriculture, linking the domain with
environmental, trade and food safety concerns, has mobilized new policy
actors bringing new preferences and ideas into the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) debate. This article investigates the extent to which this has
contributed to Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) in the CAP. It puts
forward the claim that an incomplete transformation in European agricultural
policy from exceptionalism to post-exceptionalism explains the limited extent
of EPI in the CAP. This claim is substantiated by a longitudinal comparative
analysis of the CAP reforms over the last two decades, applying a
multidimensional concept of EPI as process (how the formal and informal
procedures and institutions in place allow for the integration of
environmental concerns in policy deliberation), output (the translation of such
concerns in changes in policies) and outcome (the performance of the new
policies in terms of environmental benefits).
KEYWORDS Agricultural (post)exceptionalism; CAP; discourse; environmental policy integration; policy
paradigms
1. Introduction
The European Union’s (EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has undergone
significant changes during the nearly 60 years of its existence. Although the
sector is characterized by a relatively insulated policy network – bringing
together agricultural policy experts, ministers and interest groups – the
increasing multidimensionality of agriculture has resulted in new concerns
entering the debate, ranging from development and trade to environment
and food safety. This contribution will focus on the role of environmental con-
cerns in processes of CAP reform, addressing the question of in what form and
to what extent Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) has taken place in the
CAP since the 1990s with respect to (a) the decision-making process; (b) the
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policy output in terms of both substance and underlying policy ideas; and (c)
the policy outcome in terms of effectiveness.
Existing research on EPI in the agricultural sector often concludes that
environmental discourse or rhetoric has certainly increased, but that it
seems to be difficult to move from political commitment to genuine EPI
(Buller 2002), due to low priority of environmental issues and a closed agricul-
tural policy network (Lowe and Baldock 2000: 31–33). The dominance of econ-
omic and producer interests resulting from these institutional power relations,
together with budgetary and trade concerns, are emphasized in rationalist
International Political Economy accounts of CAP reform, explaining the water-
ing down of environmental concerns on the basis of material factors (Ackrill
2000; Swinnen 2015). This contribution, instead, applies a more discursive
take on the CAP (Feindt 2017) emphasizing the role of policy ideas in con-
straining and enabling EPI. The argument I will develop in this contribution
is that the incomplete transformation from exceptionalism to post-exception-
alism in European agriculture has had a limiting effect on EPI in the CAP
(Daugbjerg and Feindt 2017). While the increasing multidimensionality of
agriculture and food policy have instigated a shift in the four dimensions of
exceptionalism and post-exceptionalism as applied to the CAP – policy
ideas, institutions, interests and policy instruments – this shift has not resulted
in a full or stable ‘reframing’ (Persson 2007) of agricultural policy ideas in more
environmentally oriented terms. The integration of environmental goals in
agricultural policy and the policies’ effectiveness remain limited as a result.
This paper will build on and contribute to existing research on EPI in
general and EPI in the CAP in two ways. First, it will introduce a multidimen-
sional conceptualization and measurement of EPI that includes the analysis of
policy ideas and discourse. This conceptualization enables a more nuanced
analysis of EPI. The importance of ideas cannot be overstated, for changes
in policy process and instruments are unlikely to endure without changes in
the underlying policy ideas (Nilsson and Persson 2003). Existing analyses of
EPI in the CAP – with the notable exceptions of Feindt (2010) and Lynggaard
(2007) – tend to underestimate how policy changes are shaped by transform-
ations in ideas. Secondly, this contribution will present a longitudinal and up-
to-date multi-dimensional analysis covering the EU-level CAP reforms since
the 1990s. In doing so it seeks to remedy the shortcoming in the literature
observed by Nilsson and Persson (2003) and Feindt (2010) that studies in
EPI are often constrained to single-country studies focusing on one or two
dimensions of EPI only.
In the remainder of this contribution I will first engage in the debate on the
concept and dimensions of EPI and introduce the conceptualization applied
here. In the second section, I will explain how exceptionalism and post-excep-
tionalism are expected to affect the different dimensions of EPI. After explain-
ing the methods that will be applied in the empirical research in section three,
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the fourth section will present the outcome of the empirical analysis. Finally, in
the conclusion I will reflect on the relation between the ongoing transition to
post-exceptionalism in European agriculture and the shape and degree of EPI
in the CAP, and discuss the limits of this study as well as avenues for further
inquiry.
2. Environmental policy integration
2.1. Conceptual distinctions
In the environmental policy studies literature there is an ongoing debate on
how EPI should be conceptualized and measured. In essence, EPI is about
‘the incorporation of environmental concerns in sectoral policies outside
the traditional environmental policy domain’ (Runhaar et al. 2014: 233). The
underlying rationale is that sustainable development can only be achieved
if environmental perspectives ‘become a natural part of the goals, strategies
and decision-making procedures of all major parts of public policy’ (Nilsson
et al. 2009: 228). A number of conceptual distinctions are made with
respect to EPI which are relevant in this research: (a) horizontal versus vertical;
(b) weak versus strong; and (c) process versus substance.
Horizontal EPI focuses on environmental co-ordination across policy
sectors, while vertical EPI is concerned with environmental co-ordination in
one particular sector without cross-sectoral modes of interaction (Lafferty
and Hovden 2003: 12–14). Although vertical integration is in part instigated
by horizontal requirements (Feindt 2010), this paper will limit itself to vertical
EPI within the agricultural sector.
The distinction betweenweak and strong EPI revolves around the degree to
which EPI requires a revision in the traditional hierarchy of policy objectives.
Weak EPI merely requires that environmental considerations are taken into
account in sectoral policy-making. Strong EPI additionally requires that
environmental considerations are given principled priority over other con-
siderations (Lafferty and Hovden 2003: 9). This paper takes a pragmatic
point of departure: that for EPI to have occurred some degree of revision in
priorities needs to have taken place, increasing the role of environmental con-
siderations, but not necessarily giving them principled priority.
Finally, EPI can simultaneously be considered a process ‘leading to changes
in policy-making and policy outputs’ and a ‘substantive result of changes in
policy decision-making, behaviour or ideas’ (Kivimaa and Mickwitz 2006:
731, emphasis added). Those interested in the policy process focus on how
environmental considerations are institutionalized into the policy process,
while those focusing on the substantive result of that process investigate
whether it led to more environmentally friendly policies (output) and environ-
mental performance (outcome) (Persson 2007: 30–1). A sole focus on the
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process dimension would uncover the institutional strategies applied to
enhance EPI but neglect the connection with the ends this process aims to
achieve. This paper will therefore take both process and substance into
account, differentiating between a process, output and outcome dimension
of EPI.
2.2. The CAP and dimensions of EPI
This section will present indicators for the three dimensions of EPI, inspired by
the existing literature (Lafferty and Hovden 2003; Nilsson and Persson 2003;
Nilsson et al. 2009), and adapted to the case where appropriate. Secondly, it
will introduce ideational and discursive elements and connect these analyti-
cally to the process and output dimensions of EPI.
The measurement of process EPI focuses both on actors’ structural power
position (based in institutions) and their effect on policy formulation.1 For the
former, it analyses the procedures that are put in place to (a) co-ordinate
decision-making; (b) enhance the comprehensiveness and inclusiveness of
actor representation; and (c) institutionalize evaluation of and reporting on
environmental impact. For the latter, it investigates whether these procedures
contributed to the inclusion and relative weight attached to environmental
concerns in the policy-formulation process. Although the first group of indi-
cators may be considered institutional in nature (see Nilsson et al. 2009:
340), they are studied in and affect the policy-formulation process and are
therefore included in the process dimension here.
The output dimension focuses on the policies introduced or adapted
through the different CAP reforms. I distinguish between changes in policy
settings, instruments and objectives, evaluating whether these have resulted
in (potentially) greener policies. Whether these policy changes signify success-
ful EPI, however, still depends on their environmental effects.
This is the focus of the analysis of EPI as outcome where first of all, the
implementation of the policies will be analyzed, checking whether the policies
are applied with the actual environmental aim of the policy in mind or if they
are watered down during implementation. Secondly, the environmental per-
formance of the policies is analyzed: do the policies have positive environ-
mental effects?
The significance of a change in underlying policy ideas to achieve EPI is
highlighted by the less commonly used ‘reframing approach’, emphasizing
that EPI requires the reframing of ‘fundamental problem perceptions, causal
narratives and overall policy goals into more environmental terms’ (Persson
2007: 43).2 This resonates with the discursive approach taken in this contri-
bution, allowing for the incorporation of ideational and discursive dimensions
in the analysis (Feindt 2017). In the field of agricultural policy studies, the role
of ideational factors is usually the subject of the debate on rival policy
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paradigms and their supporting discourses. Policy paradigms contain ideas
with respect to the understanding of the policy problem, appropriate policy
goals, and the proper instruments to achieve them (Hall 1993). Policy actors
apply a certain justificatory discourse in the policy-making process legitimat-
ing the policy objectives and instruments associated with the policy paradigm
they prefer to be ‘institutionalized’ in the policy output (Feindt 2017; Skogstad
1998; see also Weber and Driessen 2010). In this paper the ideational aspects
of EPI are therefore conceptualized in the dimensions of EPI as output and
process (see Table 1).
Three paradigms are usually distinguished in the agricultural domain: the
‘dependent’ or ‘assisted agriculture’ paradigm; the ‘multifunctionality’ or
‘public goods’ paradigm; and the ‘competitive’ or ‘liberal agriculture’ para-
digm (Coleman 1998; Daugbjerg 2003; Skogstad 1998).
First, the state-assisted agriculture paradigm has a productivist focus,
emphasizing that the farm sector contributes to a secure and safe food
supply. Due to unstable natural conditions and the sub-optimality of the
price mechanism to secure income stability and productivity, adherents to
this paradigm argue that the farm sector is exceptional and warrants
special treatment (i.e., public intervention) (Daugbjerg 2003; Skogstad
1998). Secondly, the multifunctionality paradigm emphasizes the environ-
mental and social services of farming. Farmers are not sufficiently rewarded
by the market for these public goods and should therefore legitimately
receive public money (Coleman 1998, Daugbjerg 2003). Finally, the competi-
tive paradigm argues that agriculture is an economic sector like any other in
which the farmer should be treated as an entrepreneur and market forces
should take precedence over state intervention (Coleman 1998; Skogstad
1998). The ideas contained in the multifunctionality paradigm resonate with
the ideas underlying EPI, attaching importance to environmental concerns,
whereas the other paradigms tend to prioritize economic concerns. A shift
towards the multifunctionality paradigm should therefore be conducive to
EPI (see also Feindt 2010: 296).
3. EPI and (post-)exceptionalism
Agricultural exceptionalism is about treating the agricultural sector differently
from other economic sectors and includes a ‘belief system that provides cogni-
tive justification andpolitical legitimation’ for this special treatment (Daugbjerg
and Feindt 2017). The idea of agricultural exceptionalism was part of the state-
assisted policy paradigm both in European and US agriculture after the Second
World War (Skogstad 1998) and became the dominant ideational framework
(Feindt 2017). It became challenged since the 1980s, however, due to a mix
of budgetary, trade-related and environmental considerations, and a trans-
formation to a post-exceptionalist agriculture set in.3 In this paper I take
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exceptionalismandpost-exceptionalismas ideal-types, each characterizedby a
specific combination of ideas, institutions, interests andpolicies (seeDaugbjerg
and Feindt 2017). I hypothesize that each of these two specific combinations of
variables has different effects on the likely forms and degrees of EPI in agricul-
ture, affecting EPI as process, output and outcome (see Table 1).
During the process of policy formation the institutional and ideational
aspects of exceptionalism and post-exceptionalism are likely to affect EPI.
Institutionally, post-exceptionalism is likely to be more conducive to EPI
than exceptionalism, because it is characterized by a more open policy
network. Ideationally, agricultural exceptionalism fits with the state-assisted
policy paradigm, while post-exceptionalism resonates with the multifunction-
ality paradigm (Daugbjerg and Feindt 2017). In the case of exceptionalist agri-
culture, I therefore expect a productivist discourse and a representation of
interests in which farmers’ economic interests are pitted against environ-
mental interests while the former carry the day. In the case of post-exception-
alist agriculture, I expect the legitimating discourse also to be based on
environmental considerations and a positive-sum (Persson 2007: 27)
representation of economic and environmental interests.
The policy aspect of exceptionalism and post-exceptionalism – connected
to the state-assisted and multifunctionality paradigms respectively – links up
with the output dimension of EPI. Exceptionalism will result in policies aimed
Table 1. The effects of (post-)exceptionalism on EPI in agriculture.
Exceptionalism Post-Exceptionalism
Process Procedures/institutions:
• Very limited co-ordination between
agricultural and non-agricultural
departments
• Environmental actors lack access to
the agricultural policy network




• More comprehensive co-ordination between
agricultural and non-agricultural departments
• Environmental actors gain marginal (‘tense’
PE)/genuine (‘complementary’ PE) access to
the policy network
• Structural attention to environmental
considerations in evaluations
Discourse:
• Zero-sum representation of economic
(farm) and environmental interests
• Legitimating discourse based on
economic (producers’) interests
• Emphasis on agriculture’s
contribution to food supply
Discourse:
• Positive-sum (interdependence)
representation of economic (farm) interests
and environmental interests
• Legitimating discourse also based on
environmental interests (but potentially
strategically)
• Emphasis on agriculture’s provision of
environmental public goods
Output • Policies do not have environmental
objectives
• If policies contain environmental
aspects, they will be voluntary
• Policies have (partly) environmental
objectives
• More mandatory environmental policies
Outcome • Very limited positive environmental
effects (unintended side-effects)
• More positive environmental effects
• Policies watered-down during
implementation if environmental discourse
was ‘strategic’
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at production and farm-income related objectives. If environmental side
effects occur, these are unintended (Lenschow 1999). To the extent that pol-
icies are considered (partly) ‘environmental’ in nature – they are likely to be
voluntary. Post-exceptionalism is likely to result in the introduction of rela-
tively more demanding and mandatory environmental policy objectives and
instruments.
With respect to the outcome dimension of EPI, more positive environ-
mental results are likely in a post-exceptionalist agriculture than in an excep-
tionalist agriculture, as the former will have more (partially) environmentally
instigated policies. Environmental policies may be watered down during the
implementation process, however, particularly when an environmental dis-
course was applied strategically during the policy-making process. I consider
the use of environmental ideas strategic when actors apply them instrumen-
tally in a discourse ‘manipulating public images and ideas in order to build
support for their policies’ (Legro 2000: 423), not reflecting genuine motivation
for action based on the internalization of environmental ideas. When environ-
mental arguments are strategic justifications rather than genuine motivations
for action, then environmental aspects of the CAP reform are more likely to be
sacrificed in the negotiating compromise allowing for flexibility, and hence
further watering-down, in the implementation process. Neither exceptional-
ism nor post-exceptionalism are thus likely to result in a high degree of
outcome EPI as long as underlying policy ideas have not genuinely become
more environmentally oriented.
4. Methods and sources
This contribution applies a qualitative research design. The sources used to
conduct the empirical analysis include: (a) all official Commission proposals
and communications to the Council and European Parliament (EP) with
respect to the different CAP reforms as well as the relevant impact assess-
ments; (b) 10 speeches for each Commissioner of Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment; (c) opinion papers of agricultural and environmental organizations;
(d) four interviews; and (e) secondary literature. The policy documents
enable measuring the policy output of the different reforms and the legitimat-
ing discourse applied to justify these reforms in the policy process. The
speeches are selected on the basis of the variation in the audiences they
address (EP, Council, interest groups) as well as their timing (public consul-
tation/preparatory phase, decision-making, communicating the policy
outcome). This enables verifying whether environmental discourse is strategi-
cally applied to certain audiences or over time, during policy preparation and
communication of the results rather than during the actual decision-making.
Together with the official EU documents, opinion papers and secondary litera-
ture analyzing previous CAP-reform processes, interviews provide additional
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insights in the policy-making process and the degree to which the mobiliz-
ation of environmental actors was effective. The interviews were conducted
with officials of COPA-COGECA (as representative of farm interests), Birdlife
(as representative of environmental organizations) and representatives of
two different DGs. Both of the latter had been involved in CAP reforms and
related environmental measures since the 1990s, covering the whole of the
period analyzed in this paper. With respect to EPI as outcome, it should be
noted that the scope of this contribution and limited access to primary data
do not allow for an independent assessment. The analysis will be based on
existing evaluations and secondary sources. Many of these sources contain
‘discourse on’ or ‘interpretation of’ policy effectiveness rather than presenting
verifiable primary data. Although this impedes drawing strong and objective
conclusions, source triangulation was applied – using not only Commission
evaluations, but also European Court of Auditors (ECOA) reports and publi-
cations of Environmental Research institutes – in an attempt to arrive at as
reliable an assessment as possible.
A qualitative content analysis program (NVIVO) was used to code the policy
documents and speeches on problem definitions and appropriate policy
objectives and instruments (indicators of underlying policy paradigms). This
enabled a structured analysis of the discourse in the process dimension of EPI.
5. The CAP 1993–2013: environment as genuine objective or
justification strategy?
5.1. EPI as output
Over the last decades, the CAP has witnessed a shift from emphasis on price
and market intervention to direct income payments – partly conditional on
environmental requirements – and rural development. A number of the
policy changes introduced by the five CAP reforms in this period – the 1992
MacSharry, 1999 Agenda 2000, 2003 Fischler, 2008 Health Check and 2013
CAP reforms – may be considered ‘environmental’ in nature in the sense
that they either have environmental objectives, or could have positive
environmental side effects (for more elaborate analyses see Buller 2002;
Feindt 2010; Lowe and Baldock 2000; Mathews 2013). The first policy is the
set-aside introduced in the 1992 MacSharry reform. In order to be eligible
for the direct income payments, (larger) farms had to take land out of pro-
duction. Combined with the 29 per cent reduction in intervention prices,
this measure was expected to make farming more extensive. Secondly, the
1992 reform also included agri-environment measures as an accompanying
measure.4 These obliged member-states to develop schemes providing pay-
ments to farmers for voluntarily implementing specific environmentally
friendly farming practices. Thirdly, the 1999 reform introduced voluntary
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cross compliance, which, if introduced by member-states, made the direct
income payments conditional on meeting a number of basic environmental
and animal husbandry conditions. The same reform also merged agri-environ-
ment measures together with other (non-environmental) measures in the so-
called ‘pillar II’, introducing a Rural Development policy next to the existing
market and price policy of ‘pillar I’. The 1999 reform also introduced the instru-
ment of modulation, which allowed member-states to reduce the direct pay-
ments in pillar I by a small percentage and shift these funds to pillar II. The
subsequent 2003 reformmade cross compliance andmodulation compulsory,
while the CAP Health Check in 2008 raised the modulation percentage,
expanding the amount of money shifting towards rural development. The
latter only increases potential spending on agri-environment measures,
however, as pillar II also contains many non-environmental policies. Finally,
the 2013 reform introduced the greening criteria, which made the payment
of 30 per cent of the direct income payments dependent on compliance
with three environmental requirements (maintaining permanent grassland,5
5 per cent environmental focus area and crop diversification). The same
reform also introduced a change affecting the settings of the policy instru-
ments in pillars I and II by enabling (but not requiring) member-states to
decrease direct income payments (pillar I) above a certain level (degressivity)
and inject the ‘capped’ funds into pillar II.
These measures could potentially have positive environmental effects, but
these were not necessarily their main objective (Feindt 2010). Commission
documents show that in 1992, set-aside was mainly instigated by economic
considerations, such as over-production, farm income and budgetary con-
straints (Lenschow 1999: 101; MacSharry 1991a, 1991b; and Buller 2002
reach a similar conclusion). That environmental objectives were never a key
objective (Lowe and Baldock 2000: 42) is evidenced by the fact that – when
set-aside was no longer necessary or even undesirable in the light of changing
market conditions and increased anxieties for food security – compulsory set-
aside was first set at zero in the 2008 reform (with Fischer-Boel [2007] arguing
that ‘set aside is a support management tool, not an environmental tool’) and
phased out in 2013. Contrary to set-aside, the agri-environment measures in
the 1992 reform were genuinely focused on alleviating environmental press-
ures, marking a start of more integrated policies (Buller 2002; Mathews 2013).
They were, however, only an ‘accompanying’ measure, signifying merely a
small part of total CAP spending. The cross compliance and greening criteria
served environmental objectives – ranging from preventing soil erosion and
water pollution to securing a minimum level of maintenance of the land
and biodiversity. They introduced only limited additional environmental
objectives, however, as part of the cross compliance criteria linked existing
legislation to direct payments. The slow development in policies serving
environmental purposes in the CAP (but their increasing compulsoriness) is
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in accordance with the fact that in 1992 the transformation from exceptional-
ism to post-exceptionalism was only in its early stages, while it had progressed
but was still not complete by 2013. Although an increasing number of policy
objectives and instruments in accordance with both the multifunctionality
(e.g., agri-environment measures and cross compliance) and competitive
paradigm (e.g., guarantee price reductions) became institutionalized in the
CAP over time, this never fully eclipsed the existing institutionalization of
the dependent agriculture paradigm (e.g., income support measures) that
had resulted from the longstanding discursive hegemony of a productivist
discourse rooted in agricultural exceptionalism (cf. Feindt 2017).
5.2. EPI as process
5.2.1. Procedures and institutions
Environmental considerations are brought into the CAP debate by environ-
mentally oriented services and staff within DG AGRI, interlocutors of DG
ENVI, environmental groups and by the EP’s COMENVI. The formal institutional
rules on co-ordination are that with respect to Commission proposals all DGs
are consulted. Apart from that many informal contacts between the DGs exist.
It is particularly through these informal contacts and consultations that DG
ENVI influences the CAP (interviews with Commission officials, 1 April 2016;
28 April 2016).
Turning to access and influence, both farm interest groups and environ-
mental groups have formal access through the Advisory Groups (Civil Dialo-
gue Groups since 2014) of DG AGRI. The number and composition of these
groups have changed over the years, improving the representation of
environmental interests (Feindt 2010; interview with Birdlife official 19 May
2016).6 Nevertheless, agricultural producers and traders still make up the
vast majority of representatives in Civil Dialogue Groups and farm interest
representatives have extensive informal access to decision-makers (interview
with COPA-COGECA official 10 May 2016).
In the decision-making process on CAP reform, the Council of Agriculture
Ministers plays a dominant role, and agriculture ministers tend to be more
open to lobbying efforts of farm interest groups than those of environmental
groups (Greer and Hind 2012). This is therefore a likely venue for the watering-
down of environmental elements in reform proposals. Originally, the EP could
only give its opinion on CAP reforms, but since the Lisbon Treaty, it acquired
co-decision. The post-2013 reform is therefore the only reform until now in
which we can see how this enhanced role of the EP played out (see Greer
2017).
Finally, when it comes to evaluation and reporting on environmental objec-
tives a procedure of ex ante impact assessments and ex post evaluations is
institutionalized. The degree to which environmental objectives are part of
10 G. ALONS
the impact assessments and evaluations compared to other criteria evolved
over time. In the impact assessment for the 1999 and 2003 CAP reforms,
the emphasis was on the expected consequences of the proposed policy
for farm income and market stability mainly, while only a few pages of the
extensive reports were devoted to the environment and rural development
(Commission 1998, 2003). This conclusion is supported by existing research
on EU ex ante impact assessments, indicating the narrow focus of such assess-
ments and bias towards economic impacts (Hertin et al. 2009). From the 2008
Health Check onwards, estimated environmental consequences of different
policy options are more consistently and substantially discussed in the
impact assessments (Commission 2008, 2011).
5.2.2. The CAP reform negotiating process and legitimating discourse
With respect to the 1992 reform, the Commission champions a productivist
discourse, but new discursive elements are introduced, including the ‘dual
role of the farmer as a producer of our food supplies and as a guardian of
the countryside’ (MacSharry 1991a). The latter ‘multifunctional’ environment-
related consideration, however, surfaces in the policy preparation and result
communication phases rather than in the decision-making arena, pointing at
potentially strategic usage of the argument. Daugbjerg (2003) and Feindt
(2017) reach similar conclusions, claiming that the Commission’s recourse to
amultifunctionality discourse appears to be its response to the neoliberal chal-
lenge in the early 1990s, enabling a reframing of the CAP in order to preserve
agricultural exceptionalism, albeit based on a different rationale.
The role of DG ENVI and environmental groups was limited in the 1992
reform. Even the agri-environment measures were fully instigated and devel-
oped by DG AGRI (interviews with Commission officials, 1 April 2016; 28 April
2016). The demands of environmental groups had instead focused on
environmental conditionality. When such conditionality through cross compli-
ance rules was introduced on a voluntary basis in 1999 and made mandatory
in the 2003 reform, it was genuinely co-developed by DG AGRI and DG ENVI
(interviews with Commission officials, 1 April 2016; 28 April 2016). This was
possible partly because within DG AGRI only a small number of reform-
minded people, with close contacts to environmentalists, were instructed
by Commissioner Fischler to prepare the reforms (interview with Commission
official 28 April 2016). Member-state opposition to cross compliance and
modulation, however, caused the Commission to leave the usage of these
instruments up to member-states’ discretion in the 1999 reform (Schwaag
Serger 2001: 103–4).
Analysis of the discourse applied during the decision-making process on
the two reforms allows for a good illustration of what can be expected
(Table 1) under the circumstances of an incomplete shift towards post-
exceptionalism. On the one hand, the Commission presents a consistent
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discourse (no significant variation in terms of audience or timing): (a) assum-
ing potential harmony between economic and environmental objectives,
combining producer interests and environmental concerns (Fischler 2003);
and (b) justifying direct income payments on the basis of a multifunctional-
ity discourse as ‘payment for the delivery of public goods’ (Commission
1998: 103; Fischler 2002). On the other hand, the Commission’s arguments
in favor of cross compliance emphasize political considerations – that con-
sumers and society at large demanded more environmentally friendly pro-
duction – rather than independent environmental goals (Fischler 1997).
Environmental discourse appears strategically applied instead of indicating
a ‘reframing’ of agricultural policy ideas in more environmental terms.
Despite the application of productivist and multifunctionality discourses
during the policy-making process, the CAP’s policy heritage emphasizing
income policy as the overarching goal remained intact (Daugbjerg and
Swinbank 2016; Feindt 2017).
Together with DG ENVI, environmental groups such as Birdlife and the
European Environment Bureau instigated the greening component in the
2013 CAP reform debate (Roederer-Rynning 2015: 346; interview Birdlife offi-
cial 19 May 2016), which became a justification for continued direct payments.
A stronger focus on pillar II policies could have been an alternative, but the
Commission preferred measures that would be applied universally in the
different member-states (Mathews 2013). Environmental organizations
judged the eventual Commission proposals on greening insufficiently ambi-
tious and feared the policy’s fate once the Council and EP had their say
(EEB and others 2010, 2012).
Both the Council of Ministers and the EP contributed to watering down the
environmental aspects in the 2013 CAP reform.7 The European Parliament’s
COMAGRI – whose members tend to be biased in favor of farm interests –
had acquired the formal lead position in the deliberation, and demanded
relaxation of the greening requirements (Roederer-Rynning 2015; interview
with Commission official 1 April 2016; interview with Birdlife official 19 May
2016). The final agreement reduced the greening requirements in terms of
crop rotation and ecological focus area and allowed them to be fulfilled by
‘equivalent’ (among others, agri-environment) measures.
The justificatory discourse applied in the 2013 reform process shows
important commonalities with Fischler’s discourse a decade earlier. Commis-
sioner Cioloș assumed that the CAP could reconcile economic competitive-
ness and environmental sustainability (2010b), argued that the greening
criteria would establish a closer link between the direct payments and
public environmental services (2011), but also repeatedly emphasized that
the underlying need of greening was to make the payments more acceptable
to society (2010a, 2011). Environmental considerations therefore seem par-
ticularly important as a political legitimation of existing policies, rather than
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as an objective in itself (for a similar conclusion see Daugbjerg and Swinbank
2016: 275). What is different and striking with respect to the latest reform,
however, is that – notwithstanding the application of a mix of discourses
(Alons and Zwaan 2016) – the post-2013 CAP reform debate shows the
most ‘productivist’ focus compared to the other four reform debates, support-
ing the assisted agriculture paradigm (see also Erjavec and Erjavec 2015). This
renewed emphasis can be explained by the experience of food shortages after
several price-hikes during the previous decade. It had a decisive impact on the
Council and EP during the 2013 reform (Swinnen 2015), supporting Feindt’s
(2017) claim that in the decisive policy arenas, agricultural exceptionalism
remains dominant.
5.3. EPI as outcome
In the 1992 reform, the compulsory set-aside and agri-environment measures
could be expected to have positive environmental (side-)effects. The way set-
aside was implemented in most member-states did not contribute to realizing
this potential, however, both because non-productive land was taken out of
production instead of environmentally vulnerable land, and because the
land often was not fallowed, but original crops were replaced with allowed
non-food crops (ECOA 2000; IEEP 2008: 16).
Existing evaluations of agri-environment measures tend to emphasize their
effect on agricultural practices, rather than their actual effects on the environ-
ment, assuming that the agricultural practices supported by agri-environment
measures will consecutively have positive environmental effects (Primdahl
et al. 2003). Such analyses find that the uptake in terms of the percentage
of utilizable agricultural area (UAA) enrolled in the programme has increased
from 16 per cent in 1997 to 21 per cent in 2009, while the spending on agri-
environment measures as a percentage of total expenditure has increased
from 0.6 per cent in 1993 to 4.5 per cent in 1997 (Buller 2000), which many
still consider limited (Lowe and Baldock 2000). This upward trend was not con-
tinuous either, and the 2013 reform even brought a decrease in agri-environ-
ment spending in real terms.
More importantly, though, the design and monitoring of agri-environment
measures often undermine their assumed environmental effects as well as
their assessability. First of all – notwithstanding good exceptions – the
member-states’ implementation of the measures overall seems to be
geared towards maintaining existing practices and supporting farm income
rather than ameliorating environmentally damaging practices (ECOA 2000,
2011; Hart 2015), impeding the policy’s potential positive environmental
effects. Next to this targeting problem, the objectives of the measures tend
to be imprecise, lacking baseline levels and time frames for measurable
achievements, which impedes monitoring and makes it difficult to judge
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 13
whether or not objectives in terms of environmental effects are achieved
(ECOA 2011; EEA 2006). The Commission, nevertheless, claims that the
measures have prevented further intensification and resulted in a decreased
usage of chemical fertilizers (Commission 1997). Whether this claim can be
substantiated is questionable, as ‘still very little information [is] available on
the environmental benefits of agri-environment payments’ (ECOA 2011).
For the 1999 reform, the ex-post evaluation shows that positive environ-
mental externalities were limited. The implementation of voluntary cross com-
pliance was lacking in many member-states and ‘national envelopes’ were
used for income support rather than agri-environment measures (IEEP
2002). The fact that the more innovative and radical elements of the reform
were optional, combined with the limited budget for pillar II, constrained
the reform’s impact (Buller 2002). After cross compliance became compulsory,
research commissioned by DG AGRI found that, despite a wide variation in
implementation between member-states, the policy had improved compli-
ance with environmental obligations (Alliance Environment 2007). Reports
of the ECOA countered these claims, lamenting the merely partial implemen-
tation of the requirements by member-states, their unreliable reporting on
compliance and the weak sanctions (ECOA 2008), noting an increase in infrin-
gements from 21 per cent in 2011 to 27 per cent in 2014 (ECOA 2016). The
Court furthermore argued that the indicators the Commission collected
data on (percentage of CAP payments and acres covered by cross compliance)
did not measure the effectiveness of cross compliance. Although, at the
overall level of CAP, data is also collected on farmland bird indexes, water
quality and soil erosion, the specific impact of cross compliance on these indi-
cators remains unknown (ECOA 2016). As was the case with agri-environment
measures, the (additional) environmental effects of cross compliance appear
limited.
The positive estimates of the Commission’s impact assessment of the 2013
reform were called into question by research institutes like the Institute for
European Environmental Policy (IEEP) (2013). It is argued that farmers would
hardly have to change their policies to be eligible for the greening payments
and that, therefore, the overall environmental benefits would be limited
(Bureau and Mahé 2015: 107–8). Moreover, the greening measures were
watered down further in the implementation phase (Hart 2015). Commission
officials also doubt that greening will have more positive environmental
effects than the previously existing policies (interview with Commission offi-
cials 1 April 2016; 28 April 2016). While a recent Commission working docu-
ment draws positive conclusions on the amount of ecological focus area, it
emphasizes that farmers have ‘optimized their EFA choices on economic
grounds’ rather than environmental ones (Commission 2016: 19). Although
it is too early to draw robust conclusions, the greening requirements are
unlikely to have significant environmental effects.
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6. Conclusion
This paper developed the argument that the incomplete transformation from
an exceptionalist agriculture to a post-exceptionalist agriculture policy in
Europe – both in terms of the associated institutional power structures and
dominant ideas – has brought only limited EPI in the CAP. While changes in
policy-making procedures and institutions have provided environmental
actors with enhanced access to the policy-making process, their impact on
this process did not significantly increase. Although the legitimating discourse
has increasingly emphasized environmental concerns, this discourse seems to
be particularly applied strategically as a vehicle to legitimate existing practices
(as is also claimedbyDaugbjerg and Swinbank 2016). Environmental objectives
have become a variable in the agricultural policy-making equation, but its coef-
ficient remains small. This explains why dissatisfying effectiveness of environ-
mental measures has not instigated more far-reaching policy adaptations.
The conclusions of this study are limited to agriculture policy in the Euro-
pean Union. Further research in the agricultural sector could investigate how
EPI may have been shaped differently in countries where exceptionalism has
given way to more market liberal perspectives on agriculture, such as in the
United States. This study is furthermore limited in depth, as longitudinal com-
parison and development was prioritized over presenting the full intricacies of
the reform process. Finally, the exclusion of horizontal EPI from the analysis
may have resulted in insufficient appreciation of the indirect effects on the
CAP of environmental obligations based on horizontal European regulations
and agreements.
What does the analysis of EPI in the specific case of the CAP add to the
broader EPI literature? First of all, the three-dimensional conceptualization
developed in this paper can also be applied to EPI in other fields. Though
exact measurements may need to be adapted, it is a rather general concep-
tualization that allows for a relatively comprehensive analysis of EPI and
nuanced conclusions based on clear distinctions between the different
dimensions of EPI. The importance of such a multi-dimensional approach is
underlined by the findings in this paper that increased access of environ-
mental actors to the decision-making process does not necessarily give
them much influence, and that more mandatory policy instruments (output)
do not guarantee more effective outcomes. This brings me to the second con-
tribution of this paper, which is the focus on the crucial role of ideas in shaping
EPI. The case study has shown that as long as institutional changes are not
accompanied by a change in policy ideas, environmentally oriented policies
will remain unstable and their effectiveness limited. While a shift from excep-
tionalism to post-exceptionalism may not be applicable to other domains
(or may differ in similar domains in other countries), these domains will
have their own policy paradigms affecting EPI trajectories. In the case of
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market-oriented agriculture, for example, environmental concerns would
have to be connected to considerations of competitiveness and a level
playing field, while a public goods justification would only be acceptable to
the extent that these ‘goods’ are quantifiable to some degree in order for
the idea of supply and demand to apply. This has important implications
for both policy-makers and researchers. The former would have to apply
domain-specific justificatory discourses to accomplish a durable ‘reframing’
of different sectors in more environmental terms, while the latter have to
adapt their analytical lenses to a domain’s ideational peculiarities.
Notes
1. Constraining and enabling factors for EPI (for an overview see Runhaar et al.
2014) are often located at the ‘governance’ level and overlap with the pro-
cedural and institutional factors I included in the process dimension.
2. Cashmore and Wejs (2014) develop a similar argument with respect to climate
change planning, emphasizing that legitimacy is a prerequisite both for policy
prioritization and effective outcomes.
3. See Feindt (2017) for an elaborate analysis of the relative importance of compet-
ing agricultural policy discourses in influencing the CAP policy paradigm over
time.
4. Article 19 of regulation 797/85 that introduced special schemes for ‘Sensitive
Areas’may be considered a frontrunner of the agri-environment measures intro-
duced in 1992.
5. Which had already been a cross compliance requirement since 2005.
6. Commission Decisions 87/70/EEC to 87/93/EEC (OJ L 45, 14.2.1978, pp. 1–68); 98/
235/EC (OJ L88, 24.3.1998, pp. 59–71); 2004/391/EC (OJ L120, 24.4.2004, pp 50–
60).
7. For a debate on the relative role of both institutions, see Swinnen (2015).
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